The law as Janus: children, crime and care by Harris, Peter
The media treat children generally as either youngvillains or victims, and as if young offenders fallexclusively into the former category. However those
who deal with them professionally know that children with
unmet welfare needs and children who commit crime are
not disparate populations. The two categories certainly
overlap, and the latter category is pretty much a sub-set of
the former, which is defined by section 17 (10) of the
Children Act 1989 in respect of a child who:
“ …. is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or have the
opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable
standard of health or development without the provision … of
services by a local authority … his health and development is
likely to be significantly impaired without the provision of
such services … [or] …. he is disabled, ..”.
Disability includes being blind, deaf, dumb or suffering
from mental disorder of any kind. Development includes
physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural
development, and health means physical or mental health.
(The relevance of these definitions I shall refer to in greater
detail in due course).
My starting point, however, is a quotation from the
Roman poet Juvenal which was used by Lord Hewart, the
Lord Chief Justice in 1931 when delivering the second
Clarke Hall lecture on young offenders – or as he called
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• if the holder of the certifying certificate revoked their
key promptly upon finding out their system or key was
compromised
• which of the two innocent parties (relying party and
holder) was in the better position to protect themselves
from damage at the hands of an impostor.
Whether electronic signatures will ever be used widely is
a matter that only the passing of time will determine. The
main issue surrounding electronic signatures relates to the
ease by which a signature can be misused. This article seeks
to show that there are many ways in which the use of an
electronic signature can be challenged, although it is
doubtful that there will be large numbers of disputes which
focus on the sole issue of whether an electronic
communication was signed by an unauthorised electronic
signature.
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The law as Janus:
children, crime and care
by Peter Harris
My inspiration for the choice of the subject of this article is the Michael Sieff
Foundation conference which took place in September 2001 on “The
Needs of Offending Children”. The focus of that conference was the
forensic dichotomy that is represented by the Civil and Criminal Justice
Systems when the State intervenes in the lives of children in respect of
events which require a judicial decision. This lead naturally to the title I have
given to this article since the Roman god Janus is always depicted as a head
with two faces looking in opposite directions.
them in the jargon of the times “juvenile delinquents”. He
began with Juvenal’s maxim “maxima debetur puero reverentia”
– which can be translated as; “The highest respect is owed
to the young”. I commend, if you will allow me, that
maxim to you. Lord Hewart referred in his lecture to the
situation of young offenders 100 years before, ie in the
1830s , citing as his source the Prison Register of Stafford
Prison. The register contained the following records –
Year Name Age Offence Transportation
1837 Matilda Seymour 10 yrs Theft of a shawl 7 yrs
and petticoat
1843 Wm Carless 16 Theft of 1 spade 10 yrs
Wm Ashmole 14 Theft of 1 book 7 yrs
the property of
the Guardians of
the Poor
1834 Geo Saxon 12 Theft of gold watch 7 yrs
Wm Bigden 14 Theft of 1 silk h’chief 7 yrs
Thos Tow 10 Theft of 1 ass 7 yrs
1835 Geo Bold 15 Theft of 1 pce mutton 7 yrs
Thos Bell 11 Theft of 2 silk h’chiefs 7 yrs
As the Lord Chief Justice remarked – “Little if any
distinction seems to have been drawn between the adult
offender, the adolescent and the juvenile. They were all
dangerous, all a nuisance, all fit for punishment ….”. We
may be aghast at the punishments our forebears meted out
for trivial offences, but that last comment is reflected in
what we hear daily from the media about young offenders.
Matters did begin to advance from the beginning of the
20th Century, the first major change being brought about
by the Children Act 1908. This introduced separate courts
for the trial of children – the Juvenile Courts – which had
both civil and criminal jurisdiction. The “delinquent”
child, that is one who had been convicted of a criminal
offence, was not treated very differently from a child in
need of care, since both were committed to the same
institutions. Institutional care was the norm. There was
thus equality of treatment since those who experienced
State intervention in order to address welfare needs, and
those whom the State was punishing for misdeeds, were
disposed of in a similar way. There was another
characteristic which they had in common –
overwhelmingly they were the children of poor parents.
Indeed, prior to the Children Act 1948 most children were
taken into care as a consequence of destitution under the
Poor Law, whose latest emanation was the Poor Law Act
1930, section 15(1) of which required orphan and other
destitute children to be “set to work”.
In 1944, according to the Ministry of Health’s
Memorandum The Break Up of the Poor Law and the Care of
Children and Old People, some 27,000 children were in the
care of the poor law authorities, only about 15% of whom
were fostered.
It is interesting to note that though transportation had
been abolished as a sentence when the Colonies had
acquired sufficient independence to object to being used as
a dump for British criminals, it continued in effect for
children. For example, between 1850 and 1967 one
children’s charity alone, the Fairbridge Society, exported in
excess of 100,000 children between the ages of three and
17 to Commonwealth countries. Children were apparently
told that their parents were dead, though this was not
necessarily the case. The Society’s aim was to populate the
Colonies with “pure white stock”, and the concept of the
children’s human rights not well developed.
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1933
Having made a major step forward in creating a special
court for children in the form of the Juvenile Courts, the
next fundamental step in the consideration of the welfare
of the child in criminal proceedings was the Children and
Young Persons Act 1933. Section 44(1) of that Act, which
is still extant and operative, requires that:
Every court in dealing with a child or young person who is
brought before it either as being in need of care and
protection, or as an offender or otherwise, shall have regard to
the welfare of the child or young person.”
This firmly established in statute recognition of the fact
that the welfare needs of young offenders must be
considered by the criminal courts. In more recent times
those needs have not been to the forefront of the minds of
the media, the prison service or politicians – at least not
until very recently, and then in a somewhat equivocal
fashion. Part III of the 1933 Act gave the court the power
to commit a child found guilty of an offence, as well as a
child who had been neglected or ill treated to the care of a
fit person, which included a local authority. The Home
Office, whose responsibilities at that time included
children, expressed the view that it “was often an accident”
whether a child came before a court as a delinquent or as
a neglected child. This rather enlightened view, however,
underpinned a policy of not separating the “deprived”
from the “depraved” on the ground that to do so would be
“inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the”
legislation. The welfare needs of any accommodated child,
it appears, did not demand more than shelter, food and
clothing.
The London County Council Remand Homes Inquiry of
1945 (1945 Cmd. 6594) was the result of the publicity
given to the complaints of a Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, John Watson, about a seven year old girl found
to be in need of care and protection being admitted to
Marlesford Lodge Remand Home. His complaint was that
a child of this age should not be accommodated with 43
adolescent girls who were prostitutes or had criminal
convictions. The public concern that had been aroused by
such matters, was further fuelled by the death of a 12 year
old boy, Dennis O’Neill, while in the care of Newport
County Borough Council. He had been starved and beaten
by his foster parents. These comcerns led to the setting up 11
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of the Curtis Committee, (Report of the Care of Children
Committee (1946) Cmd. 6922). The recommendations of
the Curtis Committee about meeting the welfare needs of
children in care were implemented in the Children Act 1948.
The Children Act 1948 made further changes to the
protection of children and the child welfare regime., but it
did not affect the treatment of young offenders. J.E.
Cavanagh observed, in his book Juvenile Courts, The Child and
The Law:–
“The practical difficulty in submitting child offenders to the
criminal justice jurisdiction was ..... that the extent of a
child’s social need and the gravity of the offence were not
necessarily in proportion to each other.”
and also that:–
“.... the procedure for dealing with non-criminal cases is in
many ways similar to that for trial on a criminal charge,
though no question of criminal responsibility is involved.”
Regrettably the similarity in procedure tended, of
course, to criminalise the civil process, rather than draw
the criminal process into a more welfare orientated mode.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1960s
In the 1960s the Ingleby Committee (Report of the
Committee on Children and Young Persons (1960) Cmnd. 119)
reporting on the issues concerning juvenile criminal
justice, amongst other things, recommended that a child
under the age of 12 years should not be subjected to
criminal trial for alleged offences. The Committee
recommended instead that such a child should be dealt
with as one in need of care and protection. The Ingleby
Committee also recommended that the concept of doli incapax
should be abolished, a step that was not taken until 1998.
The age of criminal responsibility, of course, is still 10, a
lower age than that in most of our European neighbours.
In the early 1960s the Labour Government decided that
it should address afresh the question of the way in which
the welfare of the child offender should be approached.
They decided that it was appropriate to regard the
delinquent child as a child whose welfare was at risk. In
1965 they published their White Paper The Child, the Family
and the Young Offender (1965) Cmnd. 2742. They proposed
that, in lieu of a court, cases of delinquency, care,
protection and control should be heard by a “family
council”. This would be a non-judicial body, though when
a child had been accused of a criminal offence the child
could elect to have the issue of guilt decided by a court.
This was a controversial proposal, and no legislation
followed in England and Wales, though the concept was
adopted in Scotland in the form of the Children’s Hearing
system.
However, in 1968 there was a further White Paper,
Children in Trouble (1968) Cmnd. 3601, which set out the
policy that was followed in the Children and Young
Person’s Act 1969. The 1969 Act preserved the Juvenile
Courts, but Part 1 gave the court the power to make a care
order in respect of a young offender, enabling the court to
give priority to his or her welfare needs. Part 1 of the 1969
Act has never been brought into force, and the dichotomy
of procedures, civil and criminal, has persisted to the
present day.
The philosophical argument for preserving the
dichotomy was that the “welfare” approach tends towards
an administrative rather than a forensic solution. To adopt
the “welfare” approach would result in the dilution of
children’s rights to the point of their being washed away.
This is a criticism that is levelled at the Scot’s system of
Children’s Hearings. This view is based upon the
importance of protecting the right of a child to a trial of the
issue which brings the child before the court, namely
whether an offence has been committed by the child. Since
it is offending behaviour which confers on the State the
right to intervene in the life of the child, the fact of
offending behaviour should be established with the full
rigour of the criminal process, including a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when that fact has been
properly found, with the exercise by the child of all the
rights which any accused may deploy, that the court ought
to decide upon disposal. In short, this argument is in
favour of an offence orientated approach rather than a
child centred one.
THE BULGER CASE
Hand in hand with this philosophy goes the concept of
the child taking responsibility for his or her actions. The
child, it is argued, must be held responsible for what it
does – at least from the age of 10 with regard to criminal
offences – and it follows that punishment must be meted
out to mark Society’s disapproval of offending behaviour.
Put perhaps a little crudely, young criminals must be made
to face up to their behaviour, and it is for their good, and
the good of Society, that a “short sharp shock” should be
administered to get them back on the straight and narrow
path of good behaviour. Certainly little concession was
made to the tender ages of the two defendants in the
infamous Bulger case who were tried in the Crown Court
at Preston. The courtroom in which the puisne judge sits is
a masterpiece of Edwardian grandeur, with the judge on
the bench looming over the amphitheatre of the court.
While the surroundings are certainly impressive – and
much loved by counsel – they can only have added to the
incomprehension of the defendants. Venables and
Thompson were, of course, protected after sentence by the
invocation of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in
the making of an injunction in rem to prevent the
identification of their places of detention. Nevertheless, the
European Court of Human Rights held that their trial was
in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, because subjecting them as children to the
form of proceedings in the Crown Court denied them the12
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right to a fair trial. In the words of the European Court of
Human Rights:
“It is essential that a child charged with an offence should be
dealt with in a manner which took full account of his age,
level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities,
and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand
and participate in the proceedings.”
Lord Justice Auld in his report on the criminal justice
system has recommended that there be a separate youth
court at the equivalent of Crown Court level to try children
for serious offences, and meanwhile the Lord Chief
Justice’s Practice Direction on the trial of young
defendants in the Crown Court has gone some way to
meeting the criticisms made by the European Court of
Human Rights.
COMPARING BULGER WITH TWO 19TH
CENTURY CASES
I suggest that it is instructive to compare the case of
Thompson and Venables, and the way in which these two
children were dealt with by the court, the media and later
by the Home Secretary, with two 19th century cases. Our
Victorian ancestors it appears from at least two very similar
cases, one in Liverpool the other in Stockport, took a very
different approach. It is also worth noting that the Press of
the day also dealt with these cases in a sober and much
more responsible manner than tabloid editors did in the
last decade of the 20th century. In the Liverpool case, in
1855, a little boy aged 9 attacked a little boy of 7. He hit
him on the head with a brick – twice. The attacker then
called a companion of the same age to help throw the 7
year old into the Liverpool – Leeds canal. Both boys then
watched the 7 year old’s body disappear under the water.
These boys were tried for murder, the age of criminal
responsibility then being 8 years of age. They were
convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 months
imprisonment. The judge directed that during their term
of imprisonment the boys were to be given the assistance
and guidance of the chaplain and a schoolmaster to
instruct them.
The second case, which took place in 1872 in Stockport,
concerned two boys aged 10 and 11 respectively. They
assaulted a 3 year old boy and held him face down in a
stream in Great Underhill – an area which housed the local
mill workers. They were tried, and convicted, on an
indictment for murder. However, they were sentenced to
imprisonment, but to be committed to the care of a doctor
who ran a children’s home in Macclesfield. The press was
surprisingly sympathetic to the two young offenders,
reporting on the deprived backgrounds from which they
came. The boys were released from their confinement at
the age of about 16 or 17, one becoming apprenticed to a
carpenter and the other emigrating to Australia.
To return to more modern – and perhaps in some
respects less compassionate – times, various regimes were
tried to deter young offenders from re-offending, without
great success. It was in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 that
the “just deserts” policy of the then Conservative
administration was given effect. This was a policy whose
primary purpose was to deter young criminals by
punishing them in a strict regime to bring home to them
their responsibilities, in order to turn them into good
citizens. The policy of getting tough with juveniles in order
to combat the rising tide of juvenile crime was perpetuated
in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The
“boot camp” regime introduced by the secure detention
order, imported from the United States, was successful at
least in turning out very fit young criminals , but it did not
reduce recidivism. Welfare needs was not a term which was
heard at the time in respect of young offenders, and
addressing the welfare needs of young offenders was not
considered to be an essential element in helping young
offenders to address their offending behaviour.
DUTIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO
CHILDREN IN NEED
At this point I want to consider the duties of local
authorities to children in need. I have earlier referred to
section 17(10) of the Children Act 1989 which places
upon each local authority a duty to identify children in
need in their area. Local authorities must provide
appropriate services to children in need, as defined in
section 17(10) by virtue of section 17(1) and section
22(3)(b). If a child is considered to be at risk of significant
harm the local authority must decide whether it should
take proceedings for a care or supervision order under
section 31 of the 1989 Act. It will call a case conference of
representatives of all the relevant agencies – eg police,
education, health and social services – to share
information on the child’s circumstances. If on the basis of
that information the local authority is satisfied that the
criteria in section 31 of the 1989 Act are fulfilled it will
usually institute care proceedings. The criteria are that the
child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm by
reason of not being given the care that it would be
reasonable to expect a parent to give to a child, or that the
child is beyond parental control. Harm is defined as ill-
treatment or the impairment of health or development,
and development means physical, intellectual, emotional,
social or behavioural development, health means physical
or mental health and ill-treatment includes sexual abuse
and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.
The circumstances of young offenders, particularly
persistent young offenders, will frequently meet one or
both the criteria contained in section 31. Young offenders
in custody, whether on remand or undergoing a custodial
sentence, will often also be in circumstances where the
criterion of significant harm is fulfilled, because of deficits
in the care they are afforded by the Prison Service.
However, the Children Act 1989 is not applied by local
authorities in respect of a child in custody (see R (on the 13
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application of the Howard League for Penal Reform) v
Secretaries of State for the Home Department and for the
Department of Health [2002] EWHC 2497 (Admin))
unless remanded under section 25 of the Children Act to
local authority secure accommodation. Nor does the
Prison Department have any duty under the Children Act
towards young offenders in its care. A parent who locked a
child in a small room containing a lavatory for 20 hours a
day, and made the child eat all its meals there, would
certainly be regarded as not providing the care which a
reasonable parent would give a child, and the child would
undoubtedly be at risk of significant harm within the
definition of harm in Section 31 of the Children Act.
Many young offenders in custody are subjected to
conditions of this sort. In 1991 and 1995 respectively two
research studies were published by Boswell of the
University of East Anglia. He was particularly concerned
with child offenders who had committed serious offences
– eg murder, arson, rape etc – which had been dealt with
by custodial sentences under section 53 of the Children
and Young Persons Act 1933. He found that 91% of these
young offenders had experienced childhood trauma by
abuse, loss (such as bereavement) or both. While treatment
for children may be available in the child care system, it is
hardly ever available in the prison system. Boswell found
that where it is available it is usually provided because of
the personal interest taken by individual prison or
probation officers in a particular institution. There is no
juvenile equivalent of Grendon Underwood where adult
prisoners participate in very successful therapeutic and
rehabilitative programmes.
The present Administration proposed a new system of
Criminal Youth Justice in its 1997 White Paper No More
Excuses – A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in
England and Wales (Cm. 3809). It gave effect to those
proposals in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Its aim is to
place greater emphasis on rehabilitation of offenders and
prevention of offending. It does this through the work of
the Youth Justice Board which was created by section 41 of
the 1998 Act. The Board is responsible for advising the
Home Secretary, setting, monitoring and inspecting
standards for punishment in the community, identifying
and disseminating good practice and for commissioning
and purchasing places in the “secure estate” (ie young
offender institutions) from the Prison Department It
monitors the work in the community of the Youth
Offending Teams (YOTS).
These teams are provided by local authorities under
sections 38 and 39 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
They are made up of members from the police, probation,
health, education and social services, as well as from Drugs
Agencies, Mentors, Voluntary Agencies and Youth Services.
154 of these teams were set up by April 2002. Their aim is
to help young offenders change their behaviour, but they
also administer punishment in the community which
includes the Intensive Supervision and Surveillance
Programmes concerned with the 3% of young offenders
who commit 25% of offences. The YOTS retain
responsibility for young offenders who are serving
custodial sentences, though the relationship between the
YOTS and the Prison Officers is not always an easy one.
INITIATIVES IN DEALING WITH YOUNG
OFFENDERS
The Government has taken a number of initiatives in
dealing with young offenders, with a strong emphasis on
crime prevention, and some of them do include measures
to remedy deficits in the circumstances of young offenders.
New orders have been introduced under the 1998 Act,
such as the Parenting Order (section 8), which requires
parents to attend for advice and training sessions, the
Reparation Order (section 67) and Curfew Orders (section
14) enforced by electronic tagging. None of these,
however, save perhaps the Parenting Order, seek to address
the welfare needs of young offenders. Nor does the power,
taken in section 130 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act
2001, to remand in custody for a wider range of offences
young offenders who are alleged to have committed
offences while on bail.
Of course, these are all measures directed towards
protecting the citizen from criminal activity, and that is a
necessary and laudable purpose. No one would sensibly
disagree with appropriate measures to reduce crime,
especially street crime and offences of violence. Why then,
as the tabloid press might ask, the concern with welfare
needs of young thugs? The answer lies in the research into
the characteristics and backgrounds of young offenders.
The risk factors for offending are well-established – low
educational achievement, bullying at home and at school,
truanting, poor and harsh parenting, poverty and poor
housing, substance abuse and the high availability of drugs
and poor mental health. A high proportion of young
offenders have some form of mental disorder stemming
from such causes as physical, emotional and sexual abuse,
physical disability such as deafness and speech disorders,
drug and alcohol abuse as well as learning difficulty. These
in turn give rise to severe literacy problems and difficulties
in communication. If help is not given in overcoming these
severe disadvantages a child will face enormous obstacles to
gaining a reasonable education and acquiring life and work
skills to equip him or her to be a self supporting truly
autonomous adult, and in due course a successful parent.
The Howard League for Penal Reform has produced two
reports on Children in Prison. The first concerned
provision and practice at Lancaster Farms situated near
Lancaster, The second report was on Castington in
Northumbria. These are two of the thirteen male young
offender institutions in England and Wales. The reports are
measured in tone and give due recognition to the work of
the prison staff. They describe, however, a number of areas
of concern about young offender institutions generally and14
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their failure in a number of respects to meet the needs of
the young people incarcerated. These include a lack of
screening of staff for suitability to work with children and
a lack of specialist training (this latter point echoes a
criticism made by the Curtis Committee some 55 years
earlier about staff in children’s homes). Sir David
Ramsbottom, formerly HM Chief Inspector of Prisons,
took a very close interest in young offender institutions and
also expressed his concerns about the lack of selection and
training for prison officers working in these establishments.
The Howard League Reports also noted the high level of
violence in young offender institutions and that bullying
was widespread and insidious, that staffing levels were
inadequate, particularly at night time, and that there was
poor preparation and education for release. The latter
deficit is compounded by the effect of the Prison Rules
which apply to young offenders in the same way that they
apply to adult prisoners. Those rules have the effect of
preventing release on temporary licence (that is to be
allowed out of prison for a short period) if a prisoner has
committed certain offences, which include bail offences. It
is not uncommon for young offenders not to come to court
on every occasion when they should do so, and as a
consequence breach their bail conditions. If given a
custodial sentence, that is a detention and training order
under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the rules will
later preclude them being released on temporary licence to
complete, for example, an NVQ or to attend a job
interview pending release.
The winds of tabloid journalism sometimes blow hard
and politicians bend before them. For example, we read
not long ago of the Home Secretary’s response to the
pictures of an 11 year old multiple offender trying to kick
in a shop window in Bristol while on bail. His response is
to promise greater powers for magistrates to remand 12 to
16 year olds in secure accommodation, and to devise an
“… expansion of the operation of care orders and the way
in which protective custody can be contemplated when the
family has broken down, the community has not been able
to intervene and professional service have not been able to
stop continuing misbehaviour.”
USE OF CARE ORDERS
The wheel seems to turn and take us back to the idea
that placing a child in care is an appropriate response to
criminal activity. While I, for one, do not regard a care
order as an inappropriate measure to deal with a child who
is clearly beyond parental control, or is at risk of harm (as
defined in the section 31 of the Children Act 1989) by
reason of lack of parental care, I am uneasy at the concept
of using care orders to take young offenders off the streets.
My unease stems from the doubt that the needs of the
child, which are not well served in local authority care as a
general rule, will receive even less attention if the child is
in care as a result of criminal offences. We must take great
care not to try to solve one problem by recreating the
abuse of children that our predecessors perpetuated in the
first half of the last century in children’s homes and
institutions like the London County Council Remand
Homes. In just over the last 12 months there have been
three deaths by suicide in young offender institutions. The
latest to die was Joseph Scholes who hanged himself in his
cell at Stoke Heath on 24 March 2002 at the age of 16. He
had a history of sexual abuse by a relative, a fight over
residence after his parents’ acrimonious divorce,
psychiatric problems and treatment. He had made several
previous serious suicide attempts and had severely harmed
himself by cutting. He was in custody because he had
pleaded guilty to robbery as part of a group of youths from
the children’s home in which he was living in voluntary
care. His family and medical history, and the previous
suicide attempts, apparently did not give the prison
authorities cause to allocate sufficient priority to
addressing his pressing needs to prevent this tragic death.
RECENT ADVANCES
All is by no means gloom, and it would be wrong to
overlook the advances that have been made by the Youth
Justice Board, the Youth Offending Teams and the Prison
Service in the last three years. The Youth Justice Board has
sought to ensure that the prison staff in the young offender
institutions liaise with their local Area Child Protection
Committees, and that prison staff are trained in child
protection issues. Steps have been taken to improve
education for young offenders, for example by a national
strategy for literacy and numeracy in the youth justice
system. A greater emphasis has been placed on health
issues, particularly mental health, in the Youth Offending
Teams. The Parenting Orders under the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998 are being increasingly used, and have on
the whole been successful in improving child-parent
relationships. More attention is being paid to housing by
providing better support for children living outside the
family home, and by remand fostering. The improvements
in addressing the needs of young offenders in the
community and in custody is encouraging, but a great deal
remains to be done.
There is one measure which could improve the situation
by identifying the difficulties in a child offender’s
circumstances at an early stage, and which I hope will be
taken up. It has attracted the support of the President of
the Family Division, and it might be possible to add it to
the Adoption and Children Bill currently before
Parliament. The measure is designed to avoid the problems
that inevitably arise if a criminal court is given the power to
make a care order as a means of safeguarding a child’s
welfare. The criminal process is not suited to enabling a
court to make a decision of this nature. The criminal
process is concerned with the investigation of a single event
or a series of linked events, that is whether a crime has
been committed by the accused. It is a snapshot of activity
with respect to an individual. The question whether a 15
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child’s circumstances require him to be removed from the
care of his family to the care of a local authority to
safeguard his welfare calls for an investigation into events
over the course of time, and an inquiry into family
circumstances and history. This is not a matter that
naturally falls within the purpose of a criminal court. If it
had to carry out such an exercise it would have to turn
itself into a different sort of tribunal with a different sort of
process. In other words it would have to become a civil
court conducting a civil procedure.
The alternative is to provide the Youth Court with power
to consider when a child is charged with a crime whether
the case might more appropriately be handled by the
Family Proceedings Court. This could be effected by
extending a provision on the lines of section 37 of the
Children Act 1989 to the Youth Court. That section allows
a court dealing with family proceedings where a question
arises as to the welfare of a child to direct the appropriate
local authority to undertake an investigation into the
child’s circumstances. Under section 37 the local authority
is then under a duty to report to the court within 8 weeks
whether it intends to apply for a care or supervision order
in respect of the child, and if it does not to explain why. On
the making of a section 37 direction the Family
Proceedings Court appoints a Children’s Guardian to
represent the child’s interests, and it would seem
appropriate to confer such a power on the Youth Court.
The basis upon which a Youth Court would make such a
direction would be information provided by the Youth
Offending Team. The YOTs have a duty to act to prevent
offending, and if a care order might be more effective in
this regard, then it would be proper for the YOT to make
a recommendation to the Youth Court. If the local
authority reported that it would institute proceedings for a
care or supervision order, the Youth Court would have to
have power also to transfer the matter to the Family
Proceedings Court, and to adjourn the criminal
proceedings sine die, or allow the prosecution to withdraw
the charges and dismiss them. The child’s circumstances
would then be dealt with as a welfare matter by way of care
proceedings in the Family Proceedings Court.
While this procedure may seem rather cumbersome it
has the advantage of separating civil and criminal disposals,
and of avoiding children being placed in the care of a local
authority inappropriately. It also provides a better
safeguard for the child’s welfare since the Family
Proceedings Court dealing with the child will have this as
its paramount concern by virtue of section 1 of the
Children Act 1989. That section requires that when a court
determines any question with respect to the upbringing of
a child it shall have the child’s welfare as its paramount
consideration. The Youth Court on the other hand has to
decide whether the child is guilty of an offence, and if so
what is the most appropriate punishment. Although, by
virtue of section 44(1) of the Children and Young Persons
Act 1933, it must have regard to the child’s welfare, this is
not its paramount concern. Criminal procedure does not
allow for the sort of investigation and hearing necessary for
a sound decision to be made on whether the criteria for
making a care order have been satisfied. If a care order is
made into a species of criminal disposal it would be made
as a punishment and not to prevent the child from
suffering significant harm.
I hope that this brief exposition of the way in which the
law has dealt with the welfare of children who are offenders
on the one hand, and children in need of protection on the
other, has sufficiently shown the way in which it has tried
to face in two directions, all too often simultaneously to
the detriment of the child, and with a lack of concern
about the child’s needs. With regard to the child brought
before the court in need of care and protection, the
Children Act 1989 has done much to ensure that the
welfare needs of the child receive attention. The same
cannot be said for c child subject to criminal proceedings.
I am confident that if more attention is paid to the needs
of child offenders, as seems to be the general intention of
the Youth Justice Board, there will be fewer of them, and
fewer child recidivists.
I began this piece with a quotation from an address by
Lord Chief Justice Hewart. I will end it with another
quotation from the same source. He said in respect to
young offenders :
“The State may sometimes be compelled to be stern. It must
not be cruel. It cannot afford to be indifferent”.
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